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BOOK NOTES
LAWS QUANDARY. BY STEVEN D. SMITH. CAMBRIDGE, MASS.:
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2004. Pp. xiv + 179. Notes, Index.
$45.00 hardcover.
BY JO-ANNA BRIMMER
In Law's Quandary, Steven Smith explores the dilemma facing the
legal profession-whether legal discourse is just words. Modern legal
thought lacks the "openness" inherent in the works of Holmes, Llewellyn,
and Fuller; they expressed views beyond the purely professional, creating
works connected with the world outside law. Despite the intrinsic openness,
these works sought to distance law from metaphysics. In contrast, Smith
contends that to evolve beyond this quandary, we must face the underlying
metaphysical questions.
Part I asks, what is "law-talk," if not words? A Socratic audit
demonstrates that relevant ontological inventories provide an account of
only basic aspects of law, suggesting that legal discourse may be just words,
or may require the context of a different ontology. Part II continues the
audit, framing it in a useful, albeit unusual, example-what if an alien
arrives and asks to be shown "the law"? Is it merely the profession (lawyers,
judges, courtrooms), or does it depend on something more fundamental,
namely, "the law"? The results suggest an ontological gap between
articulated beliefs and practical evidence, implying that law-talk is
nonsense. Modern legal thought does little to counter this implication, as
schools, including law and policy and law and economics, insist that law
requires a supplement other than "the law." Part III adopts a broader
search for legal meaning, which Smith contends is equivalent to the
"semantic intentions of an author ... ofsome sort." None of the candidates,
real or hypothetical, are capable of performing all requisite functions of
"author(s) of the law."
In Part IV, the author concludes that law exists in an ontological
gap; legal discourse is just words. Further, Smith asserts that a diagnosis of
nonsense is a positive thing for law; such perplexity will afford the
profession an opportunity to better comprehend its inner workings, and
perhaps in due course, fill the gap.
